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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the effect of having a state religion on fiscal capacity. Our 
analysis extends the legitimization argument, which postulates that state religion 
legitimizes the revenue-raising motives of the state. We estimate (i) a simple OLS 
model, and (ii) potential outcome models, to model the selection to observables, 
using both recent and historical data. Our empirical results suggest that countries 
with a state religion have lower levels of fiscal capacity. We then build a simple 
theoretical model, consistent with our empirical results, and show that countries 
with a state religion face lower incentives to invest in fiscal capacity as they are able 
to raise revenue through the legitimizing power of the church.  
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“No man can serve two 
masters: for either he will hate the one and love 
the other; or else he will hold to the one and 
despise the other. You cannot serve God and 
mammon.” Matthew, 6:24, King James Version 
(2006). 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The role of religion on economic performance has been considered to be crucial since as early 
as 1905, according to the work of Weber (e.g., Landes 1999; Weber 2013). The issue of the church-
state relationship, on the other hand, has received less attention in the economic literature. Yet, the 
state and the church are “two of the most powerful and longest lasting of human institutions” 
(Monsma and Soper 2008, p. 1). In many instances in the past, state leaders acted as representatives 
of God in order to gain support from their citizenry (see for example the Roman emperors or the 
Pharaohs in ancient Egypt). Thus, one should expect that the state-church relationship will affect the 
development of economic institutions. Here, our focus is on the ability of the state to raise revenue, 
which is typically called fiscal capacity ( Besley and Persson 2011). 
The literature, when examining the effect of state religion on revenues, has so far developed 
the so-called legitimization argument. According to this view, rulers are able to extract more 
revenues from the population when a state religion exists, as the church legitimizes the acts of the 
state (Auriol and Platteau 2017; Greif and Tadelis 2010; Vaubel 2017; Coşgel et al. 2018). As religious 
leaders have a greater influence on the population, they are able to incentivize individuals to respect 
the ruler, pay their tax obligations, and threaten to punish those who do not.1 Moreover, as a 
corollary to the above argument, when the state faces increasing needs for revenues, it will turn to 
 
1 Following the logic of the legitimization effect, several authors have pointed out that a state-run religion 
discourages revolutions and allows a better assignment of property rights (Mann 1986; Greif 2006). 
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the legitimizing force of the state-run church to increase compliance or even increase tax rates 
without spurring discontent. If this rationale was correct then countries with a state religion would 
have less of an incentive to undertake other costly revenue-raising policies, such as investment in 
improving the fiscal system, i.e., they would invest less in fiscal capacity. Thus, according to this 
argument, in the long run, the legitimization effect would adversely affect fiscal institutions.  
Our argument is motivated by several historical accounts. For example, in 1162 England, King 
Henry II appointed his friend Thomas Becket as Archbishop of Canterbury, in an attempt to gain 
control over the church and also consolidate the state’s power. However, after Becket became 
archbishop, he did not behave according to Henry’s wishes; instead, he came into conflict with Henry 
over ecclesiastical privileges and the church’s rents, which Henry wanted to restrict. And even though 
the Becket controversy ended in 1170 with Becket being murdered by four King’s knights, during the 
period of conflict with the church, Henry undertook a series of important fiscal and institutional 
reforms, which enhanced the state’s revenue-raising ability (White 2000). While other events, like 
the war with France, may have affected the decision to invest in fiscal capacity,2 one cannot rule out 
the effect of the conflict between the state and the church. If Henry had secured increased revenues 
through his control over the church, his incentives to invest in fiscal capacity would have been 
different.  
The case of King Otto in Greece provides similar conclusions, but in a country with a state 
religion. To raise revenues, to repay early Greece’s debt to France, King Otto proclaimed the 
autocephaly of the Greek Orthodox Church. This allowed him to declare all uninhibited monasteries 
as government property and, at the same time, tax all inhabited ones with a tax equal to 1/10 of their 
 
2 This is consistent with the standard view held in the literature (Besley and Persson 2013) that external 
conflicts have a strong positive impact on fiscal capacity. 
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total production (Mamoukas 1859). Fiscal reforms, however, were not implemented. In other words, 
the existence of state religion gave Otto the opportunity to use control over the church and its rents 
directly, instead of investing in fiscal capacity.  
The present paper is related to a number of studies that examine the determinants of fiscal 
capacity (Thies 2004; Besley and Persson 2008, 2011; Cardenas 2010; Dincecco and Prado 2012). A 
common finding in this literature is that an external war increases fiscal capacity. As public defense 
is a public good that people value highly during wartime, the government follows the wishes of the 
citizenry and uses investment in fiscal capacity to finance it. In contrast, an internal war has the 
opposite effect. As the leader faces uncertainty over his tenure, he has no incentive to invest in fiscal 
capacity. Our argument, then, is related to the above studies as it considers the effect of a different 
type of competition, that of the church and the state.  
As a first step, and motivated by the two historical examples above, we estimate the effect of 
having a state religion on fiscal capacity in a standard OLS model using data for 143 countries over 
the 2000–2015 period. The main dependent variables are the fiscal capacity measures, as computed 
in the relevant literature (e.g., Besley and Persson 2011). To determine the existence of state religion 
we use the data of Barrett et al. (2001).  
Even though these findings support our main argument, i.e., having a state religion 
significantly reduces fiscal capacity, out of concern that endogeneity might bias our findings, we also 
employ our data in a potential outcome framework. Using an inverse probability weighting scheme, 
we examine the effect of having a state religion in 2000, on the average 2000–2015 fiscal capacity. 
The findings from this latter model are qualitatively similar to the results of the OLS model.  
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Then, to examine our hypothesis in a historical context, we extend our data over the period 
from 1900 to 2010 by employing a dynamic inverse probability model as in Acemoglu et al. (2019).3 
Our findings suggest that if a state religion is established at time zero, this will have a negative effect 
on fiscal capacity 10–16 years later. This effect is estimated to be equivalent to a 1/3 standard 
deviation decrease in the fiscal capacity variables. Overall, all empirical models give support to the 
idea that there is an adverse effect on fiscal capacity from the existence of a state religion. 
To put the empirical evidence in a theoretical context, we build a simple model of state and 
church competition. This model helps us provide a theoretical underpinning of the empirical 
relationship. Specifically, we examine i) a case where a state religion exists, and ii), a case where 
church and state behave independently. We model church as a rent maximizer, which tries to 
maximize the number of followers.4 Similarly, we assume that the state maximizes the rents from 
taxation. When we compare the fiscal capacity investment in these two cases, our model shows that 
there are two opposing effects: the first is the centralization effect, which comes up as all choices in 
the state religion case are made by one agent, i.e., the state. In contrast to this is the legitimization 
effect; the monopoly state uses the power of the church to increase its revenues instead of investing 
in fiscal capacity. This latter effect suggests that fiscal capacity is lower in the presence of a state 
 
3 The historical data for fiscal capacity are taken from Mitchell (2007). To determine the existence of state 
religion, we build a novel variable, which is based on the work of Barrett et al. (2001). Since data from Barrett 
for the existence of state religion are only available for three years (i.e., 1900, 1970, and 2000) we extend this 
variable to a wider range of years, by examining the religious provisions in each state’s constitution, as 
presented in the reports of the International Center for Law and Religious Studies (Martines and Durham 
2015). On the downside, using a more extended time series dataset results in a drop of our cross-sectional 
sample to only 44 countries.   
4 This is the view held by a vast literature (see for example Axarloglou et al. 2012; Barros and Garoupa 2002; 
Ekelund et al. 2008; Ferrero 2002; Iannaccone 1998). 
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religion. What the theoretical model then predicts is that if the legitimization effect is high, having a 
state religion will have an adverse effect on fiscal capacity.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the following section, we present our data 
and empirical methodology. Section 3 provides the empirical results. In section 5 we build a simple 
theoretical model which is consistent with our empirical results, while section 6 concludes. 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Our main dependent variable is fiscal capacity, as defined in Besley and Persson (2011), i.e., 
the administrative infrastructure required to impose a certain tax on a certain tax base. To this end, 
we use the standard Besley and Persson (2011) measures of fiscal capacity, which are available for a 
large sample of countries and for an extended number of years. These measures are constructed 
under the assumption that countries with low levels of fiscal capacity tend to rely more on indirect 
taxes (see also Rodrik 1995; Adam 2009). In contrast, high fiscal capacity countries collect more 
revenues by using the (less distortionary) direct taxes. The major advantage of these measures is that 
they can be computed both for more recent years and, hence, serve as our starting points and provide 
evidence of robustness of our main results, but they are also available for the 1900–2010 period, 
allowing us to examine the historical effect of abolishing state religion on fiscal capacity. 
Following the above rationale, we use the data from the International Center for Tax and 
Development (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2018). This dataset meticulously combines data from several major 
international databases, as well as drawing on data compiled from all available International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Article IV reports. To estimate long-run measures of fiscal capacity, which are 
not affected by short-run/annual variations in the revenue data, we compute the average of the 
variables for the period 2000–2015. Our main variables of interest are: i) total tax revenues as a share 
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of GDP (Total Taxes), and ii) income tax revenues as a percentage of the GDP (Taxes on Income). We 
also employ iii) the ratio of income tax revenues to indirect tax revenues (Income/Indirect), iv) the 
one minus trade tax revenues (Trade Taxes) as a share of total tax revenues, and v) the one minus 
indirect tax revenues as a share of total tax revenues (Indirect Taxes).5  
Our main variable of interest is a dummy variable for the existence of a state religion in 2000, 
as taken from the de facto classification of Barrett et al. (2001). This definition of state religion 
incorporates those cases where the state either identifies itself with a certain religion, or proclaims 
itself as religious, or recognizes or favors a church or an official religion or a national church or an 
established church (for the complete definition see Barrett 1982, p. 96). Following Barro and 
McCleary (2005), we classify a country as having a state religion only when Barrett et al. (2001) 
classify a country as religious and further associate it with a particular religion. 
Of course, one might argue that on the basis of this rather broad definition we cannot decide 
whether the state and the church are integrated or not. However, any general categorization may be 
equally problematic, especially when different religions have distinct organizational structures. 
Hence, instead of implementing our own criteria, we use the criteria employed in existing qualitative 
studies. Furthermore, we examine the robustness of our results under alternative definitions of the 
main variable. Thus, in the robustness tests we have also employed a state religion dummy variable 
constructed by Fox (2019). Moreover, since state religion appears to be present in countries with a 
single dominant religion, we have constructed a dummy variable for a state religion which takes a 
value of 1 when there is high religious concentration within the country.6 Even though we 
 
5 We use the one minus trade and indirect tax revenues so as to have a measure of fiscal capacity. In this way, 
higher values of these variables imply higher levels of fiscal capacity and vice versa. 
6 i.e., the Herfindahl index of all main religious groups is above 8,500. 
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acknowledge that both these definitions have similar drawbacks to our main measure, the fact that 
our results do not rely on the particular measure of state religion indicates that the underlying 
relationship does not depend on a particular definition of state religion.  
The starting point of our econometric analysis is a simple OLS model, in the spirit of Besley 
and Persson (2008, 2011). The dependent variable is the level of fiscal capacity captured by the five 
proxies of fiscal capacity discussed above as an average for the period 2000–2015, while the main 
independent variable is a dummy variable for the existence of a state religion in 2000. To correctly 
specify our model we use the same control variables as in Besley and Persson (2008, 2011), which 
are summarized in table 1.7 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Even though the simple cross section OLS model can be very helpful to uncover the 
relationship between state religion and fiscal capacity, it fails to take into account an inherent 
selection problem: the simple legitimization argument suggests that countries with a low level of 
fiscal capacity will choose to have a state religion as a way of increasing their revenues. Therefore, it 
might be the case that the legitimization effect is present but has no effect on the fiscal capacity. 
Similarly, countries with high levels of GDP per capita experience greater levels of fiscal capacity and 
following the secularization argument (Iannaccone 1991) they may opt to have an independent 
church. In other words, having a state religion is not randomly determined.  
 
7 These are: i) the incidence of democracy (Democracy up to 1975), more democratic regimes are expected to 
have higher levels of investment in fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson 2007)), ii) the incidence of parliamentary 
democracy (Parliamentary democracy up to 1975), as in parliamentary democracies the existence of party 
competition within government leads to more government spending (Persson and Tabellini 2004), iii) the 
incidence of war (External Conflict up to 1975), since wars induce governments to find more revenues to 
finance them (Dincecco and Prado 2012), iv) indicators of Legal Origins, since legal origins are correlated with 
the institutional environment of a country, hence they affect investments in tax systems (Besley and Persson 
2008, 2011), and v) regional dummies to capture region-specific effects. 
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To solve the selection into treatment problem, we use a potential outcomes framework. As a 
first step we use the determinants of the existence of state religion in 2000, as in Barro and McCleary 
(2005), to estimate the propensity to have a state religion. These determinants are the share of the 
adherents of the main religion to the adherents of the secondary religion (main/secondary religious 
shares),8 (log of) population and (log of) population square,9 GDP per capita,10 two dummy variables, 
taking the value of 1 if the country was communist in 2000 and in 1985, respectively,11 and an 
indicator for constraints on the chief executive variable (Executive Constraints).12 
Then, we employ an inverse probability weighting model, to create pseudo-randomization, 
where the treatment, i.e., the existence of a state religion, is independent of the measured 
confounders. This method estimates the average difference in fiscal capacity between countries with 
and without a state religion, by placing higher weights on the outcome of countries that are less likely 
to have a state religion. And if the selection of treatment is properly modeled, then we are able to 
estimate the causal effect of having a state religion on fiscal capacity.13 
 
8 Countries where more adherents are concentrated to one denomination are more likely to have state 
religions 
9 As population increases, a state religion can survive more easily. However, after a threshold level of 
population further growth in population increases religion-adherence homogeneity, attracting more religious 
denominations and reducing the probability of having a state religion. 
10 We expect decreases in religious participation as GDP increases (Iannaccone 1991; Opfinger 2011). On the 
other hand, richer nations may spend more money on religious activities, thus creating an ambiguous effect. 
11 Communist countries are less likely to establish state religions (Anderson 1994) 
12 The difference with the cross section OLS model and the cross section inverse probability model is that the 
latter, instead of modeling fiscal capacity, as the OLS does, it models the probability of having a state religion. 
This is an important issue, as the literature on fiscal capacity has been rather inconclusive on the determinants 
of fiscal capacity. 
13 The inverse probability model has several advantages. First, as long as the selection to state religion is 
properly modeled, as in Barro and McCleary (2005), we do not need to have a proper model for fiscal capacity, 
which appears to be an issue of controversy among researchers. Second, we do not need to rely on the 
selection of a valid instrument, which by construction is difficult to find. For example, historical variables, 
might be inappropriate as fiscal capacity takes time to be created, and will thus affect fiscal capacity through 
other channels (besides state religion) as well. Similarly, variables that are related to religion are also 
correlated with cultural traits within the country, and thus affect fiscal capacity through other channels as 
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To find further evidence in favor of our main hypothesis, we next turn to historical data. 
Specifically, we extend our sample using the data of Mitchell (2007), which cover the 1900–2010 
period and construct our two main variables as in the cross section model, (i) one minus the share of 
custom taxes to total taxes (Custom Taxes), and (ii) the share of direct taxes to total taxes (Direct 
Taxes) over the 1900–2010 period. We include all available data and our sample then contains a total 
of 44 countries.14 
For the state religion variable, in our historical dataset, we also use the data of Barrett et al. 
(2001). Unfortunately, these data are only available for three specific years, i.e., 1900, 1970, and 
2000. To determine the year in which there was a change in the status of the country (if any) from 
state religion to a secular state (or vice versa), we use the reports of the International Center for Law 
and Religious Studies (Martines and Durham 2015). This allows us to determine whether during the 
period from 1900 to 2000 there was a change in the provisions in each country’s constitution 
regarding the state-church relationships. Consequently, we are able to determine the exact year of 
the changes in the dummy variable provided by Barrett et al. (2001), when there was a change, or to 
determine if indeed there was no change in the associated country. For the 44 countries in our 
sample, there were 15 cases where state religion was disestablished and six cases where state 
religion was established.15  
 
well. In the absence of instruments, a potential outcomes model might be the only solution to estimate a 
causal effect. Third, the robustness of the inverse probability weighting model can be evaluated through the 
application of a double robust model, which uses both the results of the inverse probability weighting model 
and the standard regression model, and for consistent requires only one of these models to be correctly 
specified. Finally, in practical terms, it allows for a direct comparison with the panel data dynamic model used, 
we also apply in our analysis.  
14 The country sample for all cases is listed in the appendix. 
15 Even though we are constrained by the unavailability of the data for fiscal capacity to only 44 countries, an 
additional advantage of using the inverse probability weighting model is that it is not affected by the low 
number of treatments, in contrast to other potential outcome models, such as the regression adjustment 
method or the propensity score matching.   
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The final panel dataset can then be estimated with a semi-parametric inverse probability 
weighting method as in Angrist et al. (2018), Acemoglu et al. (2019), and Adam and Tsarsitalidou 
(2019). This method allows us to model the counterfactual scenario, i.e., the path of fiscal capacity 
when there is no change in the constitutional status of the church. Following this analysis, any 
deviation from the counterfactual scenario is attributed to the treatment, i.e., change in the state-
church relationship.  
This method fits to our setting for several reasons: First, it does not rely on the choice of 
variables to model the path of fiscal capacity, which is modeled by using only the lagged values of the 
dependent variable and time effects. Second, it examines the effect over time, allowing us to uncover 
the changes in the outcome variable, i.e., fiscal capacity, for a number of years after a “random” 
treatment. Furthermore, by estimating changes in fiscal capacity, country fixed effects, which capture 
cultural, historical, and institutional aspects of fiscal capacity, are wiped out. Finally, the inverse 
probability weighting model does not require the number of treated units to be equal to the number 
of non-treated units. This is an important feature, as the number of treatments, i.e., countries that 
established and disestablished state religion, are six and 15, respectively. Therefore, we can estimate 
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) of state religion on fiscal capacity, for t=-5,-
4,..25, with t=0 being the year when a state religion was established or disestablished.  
Specifically, once we control for the time and country effects, lagged values of state religion 
and fiscal capacity dynamics, changes in Fiscal Capacity are random.16 Then, any difference in the 
fiscal capacity between observations/country-year pairs that have experienced state religion and that 
have not experienced state religion can be attributed to the effect of state religion. Using a probit 
 
 
16 See also Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) for the technical details. 
12 
 
model, we first estimate the propensity to (dis)establish a state religion at t conditional of not having 
(having) a state religion in t-1 using year effects and lags of Fiscal Capacity as control variables. Then, 
the effect of State Religion on the change in fiscal capacity is the weighted average of the changes in 
fiscal capacity, with weights given by the inverse of the propensity score, if the country establishes a 
state religion at time t, and minus the inverse of one minus the propensity score, if the country does 
not establish a state religion. In this manner, the effect of a state religion is a weighted average of 
the changes across observations. However, country-year pairs that, according to their pre-state 
religion dynamics, are expected to have a state religion, receive a lower weighting. In contrast, 
country-year pairs that do not experience adverse fiscal capacity dynamics prior to t=0 receive a 
higher weighting.17 
The results of all three associated empirical methods are presented in the following section. 
3.  Results 
As a first step, we estimate a simple cross-sectional OLS model. Each column in table 2 
corresponds to a different measure of fiscal capacity. The main variable of interest is the dummy 
variable for the existence of state religion. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Our findings suggest that the existence of a state religion has a negative effect on fiscal 
capacity. As we can see, the existence of a state religion reduces Total Taxes by 3.77 percent of GDP 
 
17 To visually inspect whether the overlap assumption holds, in figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix, we present 
the smoothed, using a standard Epanechnikov kernel, densities of the estimated propensities between the 
two groups. As the reader can verify, there is considerable overlap among treated and control propensities. 
More importantly the control observations cover the support for all treated observations. This provides 
support for the required overlap assumption and gives suggestive evidence in favor of our empirical strategy. 
For more details about the assumptions used to estimate the inverse probability weighting model, see Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2009) and Angrist and Pischke (2009).  
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(about 1/2 of standard deviation). This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, 
countries with a state religion have, on average, 1.25 percent lower Income Taxes, which is 
approximately 1/3 of standard deviation in the corresponding variable. The corresponding estimated 
coefficient is -18.23 percent and significant at the 10 percent level of statistical significance when we 
use as an dependent variable Income/Indirect Taxes (1/10 of standard deviation). On the other hand, 
we find that trade taxes are higher in countries with state religion, as the effect on the variable Trade 
Taxes is equal to -6.77 percent, which is roughly equivalent to a 1/3 standard deviation of the latter 
variable in our sample. A similar effect is predicted when we use the variable Indirect Taxes. 
Regarding the other controls, we find that the effect of the external conflict has the expected 
sign, however, is statistically significant only when we proxy fiscal capacity only on columns (1) and 
(5). The effect of the existence of parliamentary democracy in 1975 is negative but not statistically 
significant in every column of table 1 except for column (1) where we use total taxes. On the other 
hand, the effect of democracy is positive and statistically significant, supporting the findings of the 
existing literature. Also, parliamentary democracy is positive and statistically significant in the first 
two columns but changes sign and loses significance in the last three. Finally, legal origins have a 
similar effect on fiscal capacity as in Besley and Persson (2008). 
The econometric problem with the above analysis is that state religion is not randomly 
assigned across countries. As we argued in the previous section, fiscal capacity may affect the 
decision to adopt a state religion. For this reason, we use a potential outcomes framework to create 
randomization across countries. Thus, in table 3 we estimate an inverse probability weighting model. 
In each column of all these tables, the dependent variable is a different proxy of fiscal capacity, as in 
table 2.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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The upper panel indicates the estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATET). On 
the bottom panel, we present the results from the first-stage probit model. For all proxies of fiscal 
capacity, the ATET is negative and statistically significant. In other words, countries with a state 
religion experience lower levels of fiscal capacity, a result that verifies the findings of the OLS model 
of table 2. 
Interestingly, the estimated effects are quantitatively similar to those obtained with the OLS 
specification.  
Regarding the control variables in the probit model, our results verify the existing findings of 
the literature. The effect of communism is negative and statistically significant for countries that were 
under a communist regime in 2000. Similarly, and in contrast to the secularization hypothesis, more 
developed countries appear to have a higher probability of adopting a state religion, supporting the 
idea that in developed countries people contribute more to religious denominations. Also, population 
and population squared and the ratio of the adherents of main/secondary religion have the expected 
signs. Finally, an increase in Executive Constraints leads to a lower probability of having a state 
religion. This is consistent with the view that more liberal political regimes are correlated with the 
absence of state religions.18 We should also note that the LR test of the probit model never rejects 
the underlying first-stage results. Moreover, the overidentification test for covariate balancing never 
 
18 As a further robustness, in the appendix we present the results when we use alternative potential outcome 
models. Specifically, we present the results with a regression adjustment model, which models fiscal capacity 
with a linear regression model, and estimates the ATET as the difference in the predicted fiscal capacity 
between countries with and without state religion. We also present the results of a Doubly Robust model, 
which performs an Inverse Probability Weighting on the regression adjustment model. The benefit of this 
model is that it requires only one of the regression adjustment and the Inverse Probability Weighting models 
to be correctly specified. As the reader can easily verify, all three methods lead to the same results.   
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rejects the null, indicating that covariates are balanced, suggesting that the first-stage model is 
properly modeled.  
In the following table, we examine the robustness of our main results. To save space and to 
focus on our main results, in this table we only present the ATET of state religion on fiscal capacity 
measures, as in the previous tables.19  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
As a first test, in column (1) we introduce the religious shares of the four main faiths to make 
sure that they are not the types of religion that affect both the probability of having a state religion 
and the quality of fiscal institutions. For example, one may argue that state religion is most prevalent 
in Islamic countries. At the same time, in Islamic countries, there are forms of religious-specific taxes, 
e.g., the Zakat tax, which is a tax obligation for all Muslims with a certain criteria of wealth, computed 
as a fixed share of their agricultural output or of their other assets. The revenues of Zakat are used 
to finance governance, defense, etc. Kuran (2003, 2019). Our results verify that this is not the case: 
irrespective of the measure of fiscal capacity, our results remain unchanged after the inclusion of the 
religious shares in the first-stage probit regression. 
In columns (2) and (3), we exclude the 5 percent richest and poorest countries, in terms of 
real GDP per capita, in our sample, respectively. This way, we make sure that our results are not 
driven by the high (resp. low) income countries, where fiscal capacity is high (resp. low). In all 
instances, our results remain intact. 
One issue that is worth examining is the robustness of our results to the definition of a state 
religion. Even though the definition of Barrett et al. (2001) is quite broad we want to make sure that 
 
19 The first-stage results are presented in the appendix. 
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our results are not driven by it. Hence, in columns (4) and (5) we extend the definition of a state 
religion to cases where even though there is no constitutional or legal provision to classify the country 
as having a state religion, there is a “monopoly” of a particular religion, in the sense that most 
adherents follow a particular denomination. To this end, we have computed the Herfindahl index of 
all main religions and assumed that when this index takes a value above 8,500, then the country is 
classified as having a state religion. In column (5), to compute the Herfindahl index we use the share 
of adherents excluding the non-religious group. As the reader can easily verify, our results do not 
change significantly even in this case.20 
In column (6) we present the results if we use an alternative measure of the existence of a 
state religion. Specifically, we use the data from the Religion and State database (Fox 2019). Following 
the coding of this dataset, we consider a country to have a state religion if there is a constitutional 
clause, a law, or the equivalent explicitly stating that a specific religion or specific religions are the 
official religions of that state. As the results in column (6) verify, our results are not driven by the 
choice of the state religion variable: in all cases, the results using this latter variable are qualitatively 
the same. Moreover, the estimated ATET is very close to the one estimated in our main specification.  
Finally, in column (7) we perform an additional robustness test. As in many countries there is 
a dominant religion that might possess a decentralized status (i.e., Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, 
Hinduism), with no “genuine church” that the state might integrate with, we exclude from our sample 
the 10 percent of countries with the highest shares of these religions. Except for the two first 
measures of fiscal capacity, which now lose part of the statistical significance but remain correctly 
signed, the rest of the results are the same as in the previous columns. 
 
20 The Herfindahl index is computed for the year 2000, the same year that we use for the state religion variable.  
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Given the results of the cross section models, we proceed further into examining our 
hypothesis, using historical data. Even though we have data available for only 44 countries, the 
historical panel data model allows us to control for country and time fixed effects and examine the 
dynamics of the underlying relationship. After all, any changes in fiscal capacity will eventually take 
time to materialize. Thus, church-state separation is expected to affect fiscal capacity with a time lag. 
For these reasons, we employ a dynamic inverse probability weighting model.21  
In table 5 we present the results using this analysis. For each of the outcome variables, i.e., 
variables Custom Taxes and Direct Taxes, we examine changes in the treatment that appear as either 
an establishment or disestablishment of a state religion.22  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The common result in all four cases is that the effect of a change in the church-state 
relationship affects fiscal capacity with a significant time lag, i.e., after approximately 13 years. 
Furthermore, our results indicate that the establishment of a state-religion reduces both measures 
of fiscal capacity. This negative effect kicks in after approximately 18 years, when fiscal capacity is 
proxied by Custom Taxes, and 13 years, when Direct Taxes proxies fiscal capacity. In contrast, when 
there is a separation of church from the state, there is a positive effect, which is exhibited after 13 
years, in the case on Custom Taxes, and after 22 years, when we use the variable Direct Taxes. Even 
though the effect on the two variables does not occur after the same number of years, these results 
 
21 The Dynamic Inverse Probability Weighting model has the added advantage that it estimates a causal effect 
in a semi-parametric manner. The control variables are lagged values of the fiscal capacity measure. 
Furthermore, given the nature of our data, i.e., historical from 1900, it is difficult to find valid instruments so 
as to derive causal effects.      
22 Standard errors are computed using 100 bootstraps. 
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provide support to the idea that any changes in fiscal capacity take time to occur, and hence can be 
considered a long-run effect.  
4. Theoretical Model 
In this section we provide a simple theoretical model, which links the existence of state 
religion with fiscal capacity. We assume that there is a continuum of agents. Each individual is 
endowed with one unit of available time and optimally chooses whether to engage in secular or 
religious activities. Secular individuals earn a wage rate, which for simplicity we normalize to 1. On 
the other hand, religious individuals derive utility from participating in church activities.  
The church, on the other hand, maximizes rents derived from religious participation, by 
choosing the level of spiritual activities that increase the utility gain of being religious, α. The state 
has an initial fiscal capacity level, which allows a tax rate up to t0 to be imposed on a secular 
individual’s income. Following the existing literature, and to model the legitimization argument (Greif 
and Tadelis 2010; Vaubel 2017; Coşgel et al. 2018; Auriol and Platteau 2017 ), we assume that the 
initial tax rate, t0, is an increasing function of 𝛼 only in the state-religion case. In other words, when 
there is a state religion, individuals will pay more taxes to the state for a given level of fiscal capacity. 
And the amount of these tax payments is an increasing function of the level of religiosity, α, within 
the economy (see Cosgel and Miceli 2009 for a similar formulation). This implies that t0=t*+sT(α), 
where s is equal to 1 when there is a state religion, and zero otherwise, 𝑇′(𝛼) > 0 and 𝑇′′(𝛼) < 0, 
and t* is the initial fiscal capacity which is not related to the church’s activities. The state then chooses 
whether to incur a cost 𝜑 to expand its fiscal capacity, in order to maximize its rents. As we assume 
that the state maximizes revenues, it will choose to exhaust all its fiscal capacity when setting the tax 
rate t.     
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We examine two distinct cases: (i) a monopoly-type state religion, where a single state-church 
entity maximizes joined rents, and (ii) the state and church choose their strategy separately in order 
to maximize their rents.    
Individuals 
Each individual makes a binary choice as to whether to use his time endowment in secular 
activities, i.e., work for a wage, which is normalized to unity, or in religious activities. This binary 
choice can be illustrated by a utility function of the following form: 𝑈𝑖 = 𝛿[(1 − (𝑡0 + 𝑡)) + 𝑉(𝑔)] + (1 − 𝛿)[ 𝛼𝑒𝑖 + 𝑉(𝑔)] (1) 
where 𝛿 = {0,1} is the choice variable and takes a value of 1 when the individual chooses to 
work and zero otherwise.23 Parameter 𝑒𝑖, then, is a preference parameter, that is distributed 
uniformly in the [0,1] range. A higher 𝑒𝑖 implies higher utility gain from religious activities. Hence, the 
overall utility of a religious individual is determined by an idiosyncratic parameter, 𝑒𝑖, and the spiritual 
activities of the church 𝛼. An individual with a higher preference 𝑒𝑖, for the religious activities will also 
be more susceptible, for example, to the preaching of the church. Finally, 𝑉(𝑔) is the utility that 
individuals derive from the public good.    
 
23 Our model then assumes that “No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the 
other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.” (Matthew, 
6:24, King James Version 2006). Thus, even though individuals do not choose the amount of time to devote to 
secular and spiritual activities, at the aggregate level there is a secular/religious activity trade-off. This is a 
simplifying assumption. Alternatively, we could derive the same results had we assumed that we have 
homogeneous individuals who choose how much time to allocate to the two activities. With the latter 
interpretation, it is clear that time allocated to religious activities is untaxed, exactly as we have assumed in 
the above equation. Seror (2018), employs a similar assumption by arguing that clerics have an incentive to 
prohibit economic activities, in order to exert their control over the popular masses and consolidate their 
norms and thus acquire higher rents. 
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Welfare-maximizing individuals will then maximize utility by choosing either 𝛿=1   or 𝛿 = 0 . This 
is equivalent to comparing the two terms in (1). Then, an individual 𝑖 will choose to be religious when: 
𝑒𝑖 > 1 − 𝑡0 − 𝑡𝛼   
Consequently, we may define the individual that is indifferent between working and 
supporting the church as the one with: 
 ?̂? = 𝟏 − 𝒕𝟎 − 𝒕𝜶   (2) 
According to the uniform distribution, the share of the working population is then ?̂?, whereas 1 − ?̂?  corresponds to the share of the religious adherents. 
Equation (2), thus implies that the share of working individuals is a negative function of fiscal 
capacity. As 𝑡0 + 𝑡 increases, individuals substitute work with participation in religious activities. 
Similarly, an increase in α, which corresponds to more religious activities on behalf of the church, will 
increase the share of religious individuals. 
Church 
We model church as a rent-maximizing agent who produces a religious good with a linear on 
the number of adherents and the production function. Its rents are described by:  
 𝑅𝑐 = 1 − ?̂? − 𝑐𝛼 = 1 − 1 − 𝑡0 − 𝑡𝛼 − 𝑐𝛼 (3) 
From a microeconomic perspective, religious denominations act as typical secular firms 
employing specific strategies, such as barriers to entry, in order to keep their monopoly power (see, 
for example, Ferrero 2002). According to Iannaccone (1991), people make rational choices about 
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religious activities and religious suppliers respond to those choices.24 Thus, in our setting an increase 
in 𝛼 affects the rents of the church by increasing the number of adherents, at a linear unit cost 𝑐. 
   
State 
We assume a revenue-maximizing state, which collects taxes in order to finance the 
production of a fixed amount of public good 𝑔 with a unit cost. At the same time, the state has the 
option to incur a costly investment in fiscal capacity 𝑡, at a linear cost 𝜑 per unit of fiscal capacity. 
Then, the rents of the state are given by  𝑅𝑠 = (𝑡0 + 𝑡)?̂? − 𝜑𝑡 − 𝑔 (4) 
When there is a state-run church, the state maximizes the joint church-state rents (equations 
3 and 4), by choosing 𝛼, t. In contrast, when there is an independent church, each of the two agents 
maximizes its rents separately. We examine each case in turn.   
State Religion 
We assume that a state-church monopoly maximizes total rents:  
𝑅𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝑅𝑠 + 𝑅𝑐 = (𝑡0 + 𝑡) 1 − 𝑡0 − 𝑡𝛼 + 1 − 1 − 𝑡0 − 𝑡𝛼 − 𝛼𝑐 − 𝜑𝑡 − 𝑔 (5) 
The joint maximization of (5) results in the optimal level of the two variables when there is a 
state religion, denoted as 𝛼𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑙 and tsrel: 
𝛼𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝛵𝛼−1 (4𝑐 − 𝜑24𝜑 ) (6) 
𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 1 − 𝑡∗ − 𝑇 (𝛵𝛼−1 (4𝑐 − 𝜑24𝜑 )) − 𝜑2 𝛵𝛼−1 (4𝑐 − 𝜑24𝜑 ) (7) 
 
24 See also, Ferrero (2014); Axarloglou et. al (2012). 
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Independent Church 
In this case, we assume that the church and the state act independently and simultaneously.25 
Maximizing (3)and (4) with respect to 𝛼 and t, yields: 
𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = [1 − 𝑡0 − 𝑡𝑐 ]12 (8) 
  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 1 − 𝛼𝜑2 − 𝑡∗ (9) 
Solving equation (8) and (9) yields the solution for α and t in the competitive case:  
𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 𝜑 + √𝜑2 + 8𝑐 4𝑐  (10) 
  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 12 −  𝜑8𝑐 (𝜑 + √𝜑2 + 8𝑐) − 𝑡∗ (11) 
Comparison of state religion and competition 
To determine whether state religion or competition, among church and state, result in higher 
fiscal capacity we compare equations (7) and (11). Thus, investment in fiscal capacity is lower under 
state religion as long as:  
𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑙 − 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 12 − 𝑇 (𝜑 + √𝜑2 + 8𝑐 4𝑐 ) − 𝜑2 (𝛵𝛼−1 (4𝑐 − 𝜑24𝜑 ) − 𝜑 + √𝜑2 + 8𝑐 4𝑐 )  < 0 (12) 
Equation (12) reveals that there are three effects. First, we have the effect of centralization, 
i.e., that the state chooses both the level of 𝛼 and t. This effect corresponds to the term 1/2 in 
equation (12) and is unambiguously positive. As in a simple monopoly, the state/church is choosing 
t, 𝛼 by internalizing the effect of each policy instrument on the total rents. This results in a higher 
level of fiscal capacity in the state-religion case. 
 
25 Even though we understand that fiscal capacity investment is made before any other decision, giving the 
state a first mover’s advantage will further complicate the analysis and will give an additional reason for a 
higher t in the competitive case. 
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The second term in the above equation represents the legitimization effect. The higher the 
religiosity, the higher the tax revenues are for the state. Hence, as investment in fiscal capacity is 
costly, the monopoly state has an incentive to invest in 𝛼, instead of t. Given that creating fiscal 
institutions is more costly than increasing religious activities, the monopoly state-religion chooses a 
higher 𝛼 and lower t.   
The final term in (12) is the difference in investment in the church’s activities between the 
monopoly and the competitive case. Even though it can be positive or negative it depends, once 
again, on the importance of the legitimization effect. If it has a high effect on revenues, then the 
monopoly state-church will opt for a high 𝛼. Therefore, the term inside the brackets will tend to be 
positive, adding to the direct legitimization effect.  
What the above equation reveals is that the overall effect is ambiguous. If there is no 
legitimization effect, i.e., 𝑇(𝛼) = 0, or this effect is rather small, investment in fiscal capacity will be 
higher with a state religion. Of course, the opposite holds if the legitimization effect is important, i.e., 
fiscal capacity investment will be higher when there is a separation between the church and the state.  
Our empirical results of the previous section, hence, provide evidence of the latter effect. 
Therefore, they can be considered to be in accordance with the vast literature (e.g., Platteau 2008; 
(Greif and Tadelis 2010; Vaubel 2017; Auriol and Platteau 2017; Coşgel et al. 2018 ) that emphasize 
the importance of the legitimization argument. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have tried to examine whether the relationship between the church and the 
state affects the decision to invest in fiscal capacity. Historically, the church has been an important 
agent within all countries and the state-church relationship has influenced the history and 
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development of almost all nations. This paper therefore contributes to the literature that examines 
the effect of the church on the fiscal system. 
Our results extend and verify the so-called legitimization hypothesis, which states that when 
the state faces fiscal difficulties it uses the church to gain legitimization and increase its tax collection. 
Our argument goes one step further, by suggesting that in the long run this may turn out to be a 
strategy that hurts the development of state institutions. According to our empirical results and 
theoretical argument, poor tax collecting performance co-exists with a state religion. The absence of 
competition among the state and the church induces slack on behalf of the state, which is manifested 
with lower investment in fiscal capacity. In this respect, our results shed light on the role of 
church/religion on the development of fiscal institutions over time. 
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Tables and Appendices  
Table 1:Data sources and definitions 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Max Source Definition 
One minus custom taxes 0.80 0.20 0 1 Mitchell (2007) Custom taxes over total taxes for 1750-2015 period. 
Direct taxes 0.28 0,18 0 0,99 Mitchell (2007) Income or Direct or taxes on Land Income and property for 1750-2015 period. 
Total taxes 17 7.61 0.80 44.55 International Center for Tax and Development 
Total Taxes excluding social contributions as percent of GDP (average 2000-
2015). 
Taxes on income 6.38 4.47 0.02 28.33 International Center for Tax and Development Income taxes as percent of GDP (average 2000-2015 period). 
Income/Indirect 84.93 219.37 1.67 2850 International Center for Tax and Development 
Ratio of income taxes to indirect taxes (own calculations average 2000-2015 
period). 
Trade taxes 83.21 17.68 12.19 100 International Center for Tax and Development Trade Taxes as percent of Total Taxes (average 2000-2015 period). 
Indirect taxes 39.7 17.25 1.69 96.77 International Center for Tax and Development Indirect Taxes as percent of Total Taxes (average 2000-2015 period). 
State religion 0.44 0.50 0 1 Barret et. al. (2001) and Own Calculations Dummy taking value 1 when state religion exists (1750-2015). 
State religion in 1970 0.39 0.49 0 1 Religion Adherence Data, Barro 2003 Dummy taking value 1 if state religion existed in 2000. 
State religion in 2000 0.39 0.49 0 1 Religion Adherence Data, Barro 2003 Dummy taking value 1 if state religion existed in 1970. 
External conflict up to 1975 0.30 0.75 0 0.61 Correlates of War Years up to 1975 that a country engaged in a war. 
Democracy up to 1975 0.32 0.44 0 1 Polity IV Project Proportion of years of Democracy up to 1975. 
parliamentary democracy up to 
1975 
0.27 0.44 0 1 Polity IV Project Proportion of years of Parliamentary Democracy up to 1975. 
GDP per capita 8.272 1.17 5.43 10.31 Maddison Log GDP per capita. 
Population 15.49 2.20 9.24 21 World Bank Development Indicators Log Population. 
Population squared 244.75 65.93 85.38 441.31 World Bank Development Indicators Log Population squared. 
Executive constraints 4.98 1.93 1 7 Polity IV Project Extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives. 
Main/Secondary 0.5 0.32 0 0.986 
Religion Adherence Data, Barro 2003 Share of adherents of main religion to those of secondary religion. 
religion shares       
Communist in 1985 0.25 0.43 0 1 Religion Adherence Data, Barro 2003 Dummy if a country was communist in 1985. 
Communist in 2000 0.025 0.16 0 1 Religion Adherence Data, Barro 2003 Dummy if a country was communist in 2000. 
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Table 2: OLS Results 
 
   
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. F-test denotes the significance of the model. All estimations include regional dummies and a constant term. (*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p 
< 0.01). 
  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Total Taxes Taxes on Income Income/indirect Trade Taxes Indirect Taxes 
State Religion 
-3.770*** -1.254** -18.226* -6.772** -8.366** 
 (-3.268)    (-2.166) (-1.721) (-2.271) (-2.388) 
French 
-1.679 -1.273** -7.799 -1.778 4.952 
Legal Origin 
(-1.001) (-2.008)   (-0.472) (-0.435) (1.160) 
Socialist  
2.559 -2.387** -63.894*** -14.705* 3.261 
Legal Origin 
(0.630) (-2.142) (-3.058) (-1.938) (0.560 
German  
-1.930 -1.806* -8.658 1.278 -2.695  
Legal Origin 
(-0.906) (-1.865) (-0.321) (0.220) (-0.711) 
Scandinavian 
9.438*** 5.330** 10.063 6.466 4.910 
Legal Origin 
(3.041) (2.103) (0.475) (1.384) (1.054) 
External Conflict 
10.258 -1.921 -75.313 -19.571 -9.505 
up to 1975 
(1.637) (-0.679) (-1.286) (-1.301) (-0.737) 
Parliamentary Democracy 
3.708** 1.715** -10.318 -3.818 2.638 
up to 1975 
(2.582) (2.023) (-0.582) (-1.014) (0.587) 
Democracy 
1.406 1.487* 24.777* 6.596* 10.150**  
up to 1975 
(0.955) (1.845) (1.762) (1.809) (2.273) 
Observations 
143 136 135 141 140 
R2 
0.510 0.720 0.207 0.336 0.483 
F 
7.176042 16.70971 1.68537 3.435421 6.284952  
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Table 3: Inverse Probability Weighting 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Total Taxes Taxes on Income Income/Indirect Trade Taxes Indirect Taxes 
ATET   
-2.444* -1.493* -27.231** -7.288** -8.060*** 
(-1.835) (-1.863) (-2.041) (-2.317) (-3.114) 
 
    
1st Stage Probit  
Communist 0.210 0.239 0.277 0.252 0.196 
in 1985 (0.714) (0.803) (0.905) (0.834) (0.666) 
Communist -2.993*** -3.280*** -3.679*** -2.972*** -3.456*** 
in 2000 (-8.086) (-8.659) (-9.736) (-7.836) (-9.564) 
GDP per capita 0.152 0.1117 0.107 0.143 0.142 
 (1.293) (0.971) (0.883) (1.207) (1.203) 
Population 5.406*** 5.497*** 5.402*** 5.323*** 4.863*** 
 (3.010) (3.009) (2.901) (2.899) (2.725)  
Population  -0.165*** -0.168*** -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.149*** 
Squared (-2.981) (-2.983) (-2.858) (-2.855) (-2.716) 
Executive -0.138** -0.154** -0.143** -0.130* -0.136**  
Constraints (-2.042) (-2.220)       (-2.012)   (-1.878) (-2.011) 
Main/Secondary  2.806*** 2.658*** 2.637*** 2.757*** 2.783*** 
Religion Shares (6.330) (6.053) (6.033) (6.241) (6.235) 
Observations 146 139 137 143 142 
Treated Observations 60 56 56 58 56 
First-Stage Chi-square 66.14 60.37 58.71 62.30 63.47 
1st Stage pseudo R2 34.19 32.95 32.55 33.30 33.61 
Overid test 1.97(0.98) 1.56(0.99) 2.02(0.97) 1.49(0.99) 2.05(0.97) 
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. ATET denotes the average treatment effect on the treated. Treated observations refer to the number of countries that receive the treatment (i.e., countries that are state 
religions). The first stage Chi-square and the pseudo R2 report the LR test and the pseudo R2 of the first stage probit regression. The overid test reports the chi-square overidentification test for covariate 
balance (p-values in the parentheses). A rejection of the null implies that covariates are not balanced. Additional tests and graphs are reported in the appendix. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01) 
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Table 4: Inverse Probability Weighting, Robustness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents the ATET of State Religion on the respective measure of fiscal capacity in each row. The first stage results probit are computed using the 
same variables in the Table 3, except in column (1) where we also include the shares of adherents of the main religions as moderators.  t-statistics in parenthesis. (* 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(7) 
ATET of State Religion on 
Religion Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I 
State Religion 
II 
State Religion 
Religion and 
State Database 
Excluding 
Decentralized 
Religions 
 
     
  
Total Taxes 
-2.425** -3.281*** -2.444* -1.850 -2.348* -3.871** 
-0.372 
 
(-2.031) (-2.627) (-1.768) (-1.439) (-1.771) (-2.489) 
(-0.244) 
Income Taxes 
-1.477* -2.040*** -1.475* -1.198 -1.372* -2.483** 
-0.664 
 
(-1.959) (-2.811) (-1.787) (-1.571) (-1.758) (-2.517) 
(-0.704) 
Income/Indirect 
-24.099** -32.247** -24.579** -33.885* -27.417* -49.454* 
-20.343* 
 
(-1.966) (-2.314) (-1.961) (-1.827) (-1.908) (-1.850) 
(-1.658) 
Trade Taxes 
-7.530*** -8.642*** -8.668*** -7.652*** -7.652*** -9.941** 
-2.336* 
 
(-2.869) (-3.308) (-3.478) (-2.936) (-2.936) (-2.342) 
(-1.889) 
Indirect Taxes 
-7.435** -8.646*** -6.744** -7.117** -7.150** -16.306*** 
-6.194** 
 
(-2.395) (-2.784) (-2.054) (-2.243) (-2.318) (-3.692) 
(-2.134) 
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Table 5: Dynamic Inverse Probability Weighting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated (ATET). We present the ATET, using the inverse probability weighting and 
procedure, to compute the counterfactual. T-statistics obtained using 100 bootstraps are presented in the parentheses. All results are for 44 
countries, 6 treatments when we estimate the effect of the establishment of state religion and 15 treatments when we estimate the disestablishment 
of a state religion, on fiscal capacity. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01) 
 
 
      
(1)      
-5 to 0 
years 
(2)   
1 to 4 
years 
(3)       
 5 to 8 
years 
(4)       
 9 to 12 
years 
(5)        
13 to 17 
years 
(6)       
18 to 21 
years 
(7)       22 to 
26 years 
(8)       
27 to 31 
years 
      
ATET on One minus  
Custom Taxes                 
Establishment of  
State Religion 
-0.017 0.013 0.007 -0.010 -0.026 -0.047** -0.050* -0.06* 
(1.01) (0.92) (0.38) (-0.066) (-1.23) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-1.76) 
           
Disestablishment of 
 State Religion 
0.001 0.005 0.026 0.062 0.063** 0.020 -0.012 -0.032 
(0.05) (1.01) (0.83) (1.55) (2.17) (0.47) (0.27) (0.72) 
ATET on Direct Taxes 
                
Establishment of  
State Religion 
-0.006 0.001 -0.015 -0.059 -0.108*** -0.0141 -0.122* -0.158* 
(-0.42) (0.05) (-0.53) (-1.51) (-2.57) (-0.20) (-1.93) (-1.90) 
   
        
Disestablishment of  
State Religion 
0.010 0.013 0.087 0.004 -0.003 0.026 0.044* 0.078** 
(0.83) (0.81) (1.10) (0.09) (-0.09) (1.13) (1.69) (2.29) 
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Table A1: Regression Adjustment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Total Taxes Taxes on Income Income/Indirect Trade Taxes Indirect Taxes 
ATET -3.003*** -1.081* 26.257 -3.954* -5.135** 
 (-3.048) (-1.827) (0.617) (-1.733) (-2.199) 
Regression Untreated 
English -0.328 -1.463* -6.720 -0.297 3.209** 
Legal Origin (-0.471) (-1.789) (-0.889) (-0.178) (2.260) 
Socialist 2.037 -0.459 9.771 -0.572 -8.958*** 
Legal Origin (1.268) (-0.409) (0.463) (-0.105) (-2.687) 
French 3.965 -0.641 -33.781 -8.472 4.541 
Legal Origin (1.226) (-0.641) (-1.428) (-1.158) (0.820) 
External Conflict 1.425 -2.669 -32.659 -5.636 5.297 
up to 1975 (0.253) (-0.864) (-0.403) (-0.362) (0.391) 
Parliamentary Democracy 
3.444** 0.891 -21.453 -4.375 1.133 
up to 1975 (2.432) (1.034) (-1.205) (-1.184) (0.265) 
Democracy 0.120 1.824** 35.707** 10.085*** 14.268*** 
up to 1975 (0.077) (2.088) (2.161) (2.598) (3.148) 
Regression Treated 
English -10.006** -10.563*** -104.592 -26.328*** -4.606 
Legal Origin (-2.418) (-2.842) (-0.933) (-2.777) (-0.530) 
Socialist -17.326*** -21.976*** -1312.439* -76.898*** -20.581** 
Legal Origin (-2.806) (-3.108) (-1.654) (-3.966) (-2.029) 
French -11.329*** -9.682*** -186.254 -15.416** 4.701 
Legal Origin (-3.358) (-2.638) (-1.345) (-2.249) (1.066) 
External Conflict 6.927 5.254 -143.873 29.387 16.239 
up to 1975 (0.866) (1.489) (-0.386) (1.594) (1.075) 
Parliamentary Democracy 
3.886 1.621 -330.466 -7.013 -2.884 
up to 1975 (1.519) (0.665) (-1.317) (-0.818) (-0.331) 
Democracy up 1975 0.140 -0.547 -58.000 7.088 14.206** 
up to 1975 (0.085) (-0.523) (-1.020) (1.279) (2.474) 
Observations 179 171 169 175 174 
Treated Observations 70 65 65 68 67 
See notes in table 3. 
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Table A2: Doubly Robust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total Taxes Taxes on Income Income/Indirect Trade Taxes Indirect Taxes 
ATET 
-1.691* -1.940*** -25.454*** -7.492*** -8.578*** 
(-1.768) (-2.958) (-3.084) (-2.892) (-3.706) 
Regression Untreated 
English 3.926 -0.057 -2.116 -4.606 -3.375 
Legal Origin (-1.631) (-0.030) (-0.111) (-1.270) (-1.000) 
Socialist -11.541*** -4.928*** -24.585 11.199** 3.863 
Legal Origin (-4.751) (-2.917) (-1.626) (2.286) (0.446) 
French -2.793 0.281 18.504 -0.370 1.740 
Legal Origin (-1.287) (0.162) (1.196) (-0.118) (0.535) 
External Conflict 1.543 -6.476** -107.691*** -17.505*** -5.568 
up to 1975 (0.345) (-2.223) (-3.610) (-3.031) (-0.613) 
Parliamentary Democracy 4.468** -3.295* -78.381** -21.873*** 16.629*** 
up to 1975 (2.092) (-1.943) (-2.620) (-3.041) (2.970) 
Democracy -0.217 0.462 -23.834 -6.605 -1.521 
up to 1975 (-0.099) (0.380) (-1.118) (-1.345) (-0.256) 
Regression Treated 
English -14.000** -13.710*** -90.828*** -33.288*** 3.595 
Legal Origin (-2.338) (-2.734) (-2.592) (-2.905) (0.424) 
Socialist -14.243 -16.912*** -174.569*** -70.964*** 0.234 
Legal Origin (-1.620) (-2.794) (-2.709) (-3.280) (0.018) 
French -12.571** -11.539*** -57.436* -29.595** 14.510 
Legal Origin (-2.129) (-2.304) (-1.616) (-2.243) (1.560 
External Conflict 13.750 8.987** 85.177* 46.777** 9.580 
up to 1975 (1.253) (2.037) (1.777) (2.514) (0.472) 
Parliamentary Democracy 6.132 4.136 28.519 -5.129 11.901 
up to 1975 (1.177) (1.530) (1.028) (-0.380) (0.998) 
Democracy 1.289 -0.051 3.449 2.295 10.539* 
up to 1975 (0.653) (-0.043) (0.269) (0.396) (1.659) 
Probit Model 
Communist 0.210 0.239 0.277 0.252 0.196 
in 1985 (0.713) (0.803) (0.905) (0.834) (0.666) 
Communist -3.613*** -3.722*** -3.614*** -3.701*** -3.103*** 
in 2000 (-10.091) (-10.017) (-9.538) (-10.145) (-8.434) 
GDP  0.152 0.117 0.107 0.143 0.142 
per capita (1.293) (0.971) (0.883) (1.207) (1.203) 
Population 5.406*** 5.490*** 5.402*** 5.323*** 4.863*** 
 (3.009) (3.009) (2.901) (2.898) (2.725) 
Population -0.165*** -0.168*** -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.149*** 
Squared (-2.981) (-2.893) (-2.858) (-2.855) (-2.716) 
Executive -0.138** -0.154** -0.143** -0.130* -0.136** 
Constraints (-2.042) (-2.220) (-2.012) (-1.878) (-2.011) 
Main/Secondary 2.806*** 2.658*** 2.637*** 2.757*** 2.783*** 
Religion Shares (6.330) (6.053) (6.033) (6.241) (6.235) 
Observations 146 139 137 143 142 
number of treated countries 60 56 56 58 57 
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Figure A1: Overlap plots, cross section 
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Figure A2: Overlap plots, panel data 
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TABLE A3: Full results for Table 5
Total Taxes 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6) (7) 
 
Religion Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I 
State Religion 
II 
State 
Religion 
Religion and 
State 
Database 
Excluding 
Decentralized 
Religions 
ATET 
-2.425** -3.281*** -2.444* -1.850 -2.348* -3.871** 
-0.372 
(-2.031) (-2.627) (-1.768) (-1.439) (-1.771) (-2.489) 
(-0.244) 
1st Stage Probit    
Communist -3.087*** -3.010*** -2.977*** -2.867*** -2.891*** -2.592*** 
-3.043*** 
in 2000 
(-6.832) (-8.036) (-8.034) (-7.795) (-7.871) (-5.120) 
(-7.089) 
Communist 0.281 0.185 0.163 0.145 0.168 -0.437 
0.248 
in 1985 (0.951) (0.627) (0.547) (0.487) (0.564) (-1.235) (0.759) 
GDP per capita 0.163 0.178 0.091 0.071 0.095 0.235 
-0.070 
 (1.334) (1.406) (0.737) (0.585) (0.797) 
(1.612) 
(-0.830) 
Population 5.515*** 5.409*** 5.736*** 3.205** 3.989** 3.403 
2.591*** 
 (3.079) (2.957) (3.151) (2.119) (2.449) 
(1.566) 
(4.726) 
Population  -0.168*** - 0.165*** - 0.175*** -0.099** -0.122** -0.098 
0.137 
Squared (-3.052) (-2.922) (-3.121) (-2.138) (-2.444) (-1.487) 
(0.887) 
Executive -0.104 -0.149** -0.125* -0.106 -0.101 -0.316*** 6.434*** 
Constraints (-1.256) (-2.165) (-1.850) (-1.553) (-1.505) (-3.529) 
(2.934) 
Main/Secondary 2.971*** 2.606*** 2.853*** 3.138*** 3.047*** 3.035*** -0.198*** 
Religion Shares (4.815) (5.686) (6.368) (6.891) (6.74) (4.279) 
(-2.932) 
Muslim -0.104       
 (-0.113)       
Christian -1.02       
 (-0.605)       
Protestant -0.1       
 (-0.097) 
      
Observations 146 139 137 143 142 130 105 
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Income Taxes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Religion 
Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I State Religion II 
State Religion 
Religion and State 
Database 
Excluding 
Decentralized 
Religions 
ATET 
-1.477* -2.040*** -1.475* -1.198 -1.372* -2.483** -0.664 
(-1.959) (-2.811) (-1.787) (-1.571) (-1.758) (-2.517) (-0.704) 
1st Stage Probit    
Communist -3.324*** -3.337*** -3.268*** -3.425*** -3.453*** -0.46 -3.656*** 
in 2000 
(-7.384) (-8.659) (-8.614) (-9.446) (-9.518) 
(-1.296) 
(-8.591) 
Communist 0.286 0.203 0.183 0.17 0.192 -2.380*** 0.259 
in 1985 (0.961) (0.686) (0.61) (0.569) (0.643) (-4.615) (0.790) 
GDP per capita 0.129 0.151 0.046 0.033 0.059 0.24 -0.098 
 (1.051) (1.17) (0.362) (0.269) (0.481) (1.643) (-1.147) 
Population 
5.515*** 
 5.409*** 5.736*** 3.205** 3.989** 3.503 
2.465*** 
 
(3.079) (2.957) (3.151) (2.119) (2.449) (1.619) (4.493) 
Population  
-0.168*** 
 -0.165*** -0.175*** -0.099** -0.122** -0.1 
0.112 
Squared (-3.052) (-2.922) (-3.121) (-2.138) (-2.444) (-1.535) (0.720) 
Executive 
-0.104 
 -0.149** -0.125* -0.106 -0.101 -0.314*** 
6.795*** 
Constraints (-1.256) (-2.165) (-1.850) (-1.553) (-1.505) (-3.452) (2.985) 
Main/Secondary 2.971*** 2.606*** 2.853*** 3.138*** 3.047*** 3.151*** -0.210*** 
Religion Shares (4.815) (5.686) (6.368) (6.891) (6.74) (4.317) (-2.984) 
Muslim -0.104       
 (-0.113)       
Christian -1.020       
 (-0.605)       
Protestant -0.100       
 (-0.097)       
Observations 139 132 135 139 139 129 99 
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Indirect Taxes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Religion 
Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I State Religion II 
State Religion 
Religion and State 
Database 
Excluding 
Decentralized 
Religions 
ATET 
-7.435** -8.646*** -6.744** -7.435** -8.646*** -16.306*** -6.194** 
(-2.395) (-2.784) (-2.054) (-2.395) (-2.784) (-3.692) (-2.134) 
1st Stage Probit    
Communist -3.041*** -3.130*** -3.032*** -3.031*** -3.054*** -0.46 -2.940*** 
in 1985 
(-6.474) (-8.242) (-8.039) (-7.995) (-8.063) 
(-1.296) 
(-6.715) 
Communist 0.327 0.23 0.202 0.187 0.211 -2.477*** 0.272 
in 2000 (1.081) (0.763) (0.663) (0.614) (0.693) (-4.815) (0.822) 
GDP per capita 
0.151 
 0.167 0.08 0.064 0.086 0.24 
-0.073 
 
(1.233) (1.317) (0.641) (0.529) (0.719) (1.643 (-0.871) 
Population 5.448*** 5.293*** 5.684*** 3.098** 3.886** 3.503 2.523*** 
 
(2.985) (2.829) (3.042) (2.06) (2.387) (1.619 (4.599) 
Population  -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.173*** -0.095** -0.118** -0.1 0.142 
Squared (-2.943) (-2.780) (-2.997) (-2.067) (-2.369) (-1.535) (0.930) 
Executive 
-0.095 
 -0.141** -0.116* -0.1 -0.093 -0.314*** 
6.260*** 
Constraints (-1.138) (-2.004) (-1.667) (-1.431) (-1.355) (-3.452) (2.733) 
Main/Secondary 2.954*** 2.556*** 2.806*** 3.094*** 3.003*** 3.151*** -0.193*** 
Religion Shares (4.772) (5.59) (6.28) (6.812) (6.656) (4.317) (-2.713) 
Muslim -0.157       
 (-0.169)       
Christian -1.152       
 (-0.684)       
Protestant -0.119       
 (-0.117)       
Observations 143 135 139 143 143 129 103 
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Trade Taxes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Religion Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I State Religion II 
State Religion 
Religion and State 
Database 
Excluding 
Decentralized 
Religions 
ATET -7.530*** -8.642*** -8.668*** 
-7.652*** 
 
-7.652*** 
 -9.941** 
-2.336* 
(-2.869) (-3.308) (-3.478) (-2.395) (-2.395) (-2.342) (-1.889) 
1st Stage Probit    
Communist -3.402*** -3.264*** -2.979*** -3.330*** -3.330*** -2.581*** -2.987*** 
in 2000 
(-7.472) (-8.843) (-8.033) (-9.238) (-9.238) 
(-5.030) 
(-6.802) 
Communist 0.274 0.173 0.147 0.148 0.148 -0.460 0.240 
in 1985 (0.929) (0.589) (0.495) (0.497) (0.497) (-1.296) (0.734) 
GDP per capita 0.154 0.167 0.08 0.082 0.082 0.24 -0.062 
 (1.264) (1.315) (0.641) (0.683) (0.683) (1.643) (-0.719) 
Population 4.970*** 4.874*** 5.174*** 3.415** 3.415** 3.503 2.494*** 
 (2.799) (2.675) (2.865) (2.165) (2.165) (1.619) (4.526) 
Population  -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.105** -0.105** -0.1 0.138 
Squared (-2.794) (-2.659) (-2.854) (-2.184) (-2.184) (-1.535) (0.903) 
Executive -0.099 -0.147** -0.124* -0.101 -0.101 -0.314*** 6.434*** 
Constraints (-1.200) (-2.131) (-1.821) (-1.487) (-1.487) (-3.452) (2.946) 
Main/Secondary 2.929*** 2.583*** 2.834*** 3.046*** 3.046*** 3.151*** -0.198*** 
Religion Shares (4.805) (5.577) (6.269) (6.662) (6.662) (4.317) (-2.940) 
Muslim -0.037       
 (-0.041)       
Christian -0.999       
 (-0.602)       
Protestant -0.047       
 (-0.046)       
Observations 142 134 138 142 142 129 103 
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Income/Indirect  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6) (7) 
 
Religion Shares Excl. Richest Excl. Poorest State Religion I 
State Religion 
II 
State 
Religion 
Religion and 
State 
Database 
Excluding 
Dectralized 
Religions 
ATET -24.099** -32.247** -24.579** -33.885* -32.247** -49.454* -20.343* 
 
(-1.966) (-2.314) (-1.961) (-1.827) (-2.314) (-1.850) (-1.658) 
1st Stage Probit    
Communist -3.849*** -3.851*** -3.658*** -3.543*** -3.564*** -0.46 -3.445*** 
in 2000 
(-8.295) (-10.104) (-9.675) (-9.415) (-9.476) 
(-1.296) 
(-7.919) 
Communist 0.322 0.244 0.218 0.209 0.233 -2.579*** 0.275 
in 1985 (1.05) (0.799) (0.706) (0.681) (0.759) (-5.027) (0.823) 
GDP per capita 0.116 0.141 0.034 0.027 0.05 0.24 -0.098 
 
(0.935) (1.082) (0.263) (0.215) (0.403) (1.643) (-1.152) 
Population 5.536*** 5.441*** 5.830*** 3.160** 3.944** 3.503 2.457*** 
 
(2.953) (2.86) (3.06) (2.078) (2.391) (1.619) (4.490) 
Population  -0.169*** -0.165*** -0.177*** -0.097** -0.120** -0.1 0.113 
Squared (-2.912) (-2.814) (-3.015) (-2.084) (-2.372) (-1.535) (0.728) 
Executive -0.113 -0.154** -0.129* -0.112 -0.104 -0.314*** 6.538*** 
Constraints (-1.321) (-2.106) (-1.807) (-1.560) (-1.481) (-3.452) (2.765) 
Main/Secondary 2.800*** 2.454*** 2.691*** 2.980*** 2.889*** 3.151*** -0.201*** 
Religion Shares (4.531) (5.411) (6.058) (6.634) (6.476) (4.317) (-2.747) 
Muslim -0.158       
 (-0.173)       
Christian -0.983       
 (-0.597)       
Protestant -0.219       
 (-0.203)       
Observations 137 130 133 137 137 129 103 
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Table A4: Country List, cross section model 
Afghanistan* Guatemala* Pakistan* 
Albania Guinea Panama* 
Angola Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea 
Argentina* Guyana Paraguay* 
Australia Haiti* Peru* 
Austria Honduras* Philippines 
Bahamas* Hungary Poland 
Bahrain* Iceland* Portugal* 
Bangladesh* India Qatar* 
Barbados Indonesia Romania 
Belgium Iran* Rwanda 
Benin Iraq* Sao Tome and Principe 
Bhutan* Ireland Saudi Arabia* 
Bolivia* Israel* Senegal 
Botswana Italy* Seychelles 
Brazil Jamaica Sierra Leone 
Bulgaria* Japan Singapore 
Burkina Faso Jordan* Solomon Islands 
Burundi Kenya Somalia* 
Cambodia* Kiribati South Africa 
Cameroon Korea, South Spain* 
Canada Kuwait* Sri Lanka* 
Cape Verde Laos St Lucia 
Central African Rep.. Lebanon Sudan* 
Chad Lesotho Suriname 
Chile Liberia* Swaziland 
China Libya* Sweden 
Colombia* Luxembourg* Switzerland 
Congo Madagascar Syria 
Congo, Democratic R.. Malawi Tanzania 
Costa Rica* Malaysia * Thailand* 
Cote d'Ivoire Maldives* Togo 
Cuba Mali Tonga* 
Cyprus Malta* Trinidad and Tobago 
Denmark* Mauritania* Tunisia* 
Djibouti Mauritius Turkey 
Dominica Mexico Uganda 
Dominican Republic* Mongolia United Arab Emirates* 
Ecuador Morocco* United Kingdom* 
Egypt* Mozambique United States 
El Salvador* Myanmar Uruguay 
Equatorial Guinea Nepal* Venezuela* 
Fiji Netherlands Vietnam 
Finland* New Zealand Zambia 
France  Nicaragua Zimbabwe 
Gambia Niger  
Ghana Nigeria  
Greece* Norway*  
Grenada Oman*  
* Denote countries with a state religion 
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Table A5: Country List, panel model 
Country 
Year of 
Establishment 
Year of 
Disestablishment 
Argentina*   
Australia   
Austria  1919 
Belgium   
Brazil   
Bulgaria 1895  
Canada   
Chile   
Colombia  1992 
Czechoslovakia   
Denmark*   
France  1906 
Germany   
Greece*   
Hungary   
India   
Indonesia*   
Iran 1979  
Ireland  1973 
Italy*   
Japan  1946 
Korea  1948 
Mexico   
Netherlands   
New Zealand   
Norway   
Pakistan 1957 1945 
Peru*   
Phillippines   
Poland*   
Portugal 1940 1911 
Romania  1947 
Russia  1922 
Serbia  1920 
South Africa   
Spain 1869 1979 
Sweden 2000 1881 
Switzerland   
Thailand*   
Turkey  1928 
UK*   
Uruguay  1918 
USA   
Venezuela*   
*Denote countries with a state religion for the entire time period 
 
